Doubting Thomas

Where Credit is Due

I can't complain about today's column by Thomas, "Postcards From Iraq". At least he trusts the men (and women) on the ground.

Readers regularly ask me when I will throw in the towel on Iraq. I will be guided by the U.S. Army and Marine grunts on the ground. They see Iraq close up. Most of those you talk to are so uncynical - so convinced that we are doing good and doing right, even though they too are unsure it will work. When a majority of those grunts tell us that they are no longer willing to risk their lives to go out and fix the sewers in Sadr City or teach democracy at a local school, then you can stick a fork in this one. But so far, we ain't there yet. The troops are still pretty positive.

If you want to get some sense of the noble work our soldiers are doing check out the Defend America website. Specifically check out the photo essays, whether they're about fighting or building, they're very impressive.

After Arafat

Actually, I don't have anything to criticize in the first half to two thirds of Thomas's after Arafat column, "The Arafat Voids".
He's essentially correct here:

Excuse me, but Yasir Arafat put the Palestinian cause on the world map in 1974, when he was invited to address the U.N. General Assembly. What did he do with all that attention after that? Very little. There is a message in his life and his legacy for every world leader: If all you do is express the aspirations, but never produce the reality, then history will judge you very harshly. And any honest history of Yasir Arafat will judge him on his voids, not his visions.

However, until and even after Camp David, Friedman acted as if only Israel had had offered him enough he might have changed. (Barak's offer at Camp David wasn't enough for Friedman; it was an "opening offer.")
However here's where he starts to lose traction:

Will Arab leaders, like Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who put forth a peace plan, be ready to really help the Palestinians make the tough decisions by giving them Arab cover? Or will we simply have another generation of expressive politics by Arab leaders, who love the Palestinian cause but not the Palestinian people?

As I've noted elsewhere, Abdullah's plan was always a fraud and Friedman must have known that. As Abdullah went around trying to get support for his plan he went to (his nephew) Bashar Assad of Syrian. Assad insisted that Israel was still occupying Lebanon despite the UN certification of Israel's withdrawal a few months after it happened. If Friedman were honest about the "peace plan" he would have immediately declared it a fraud. But he didn't. He continued to tout Crown Prince Abdullah's list of specific demands and nebulous promises as a "peace plan."

Ariel Sharon seems to have already started to learn some of the lessons of Arafat's life. Mr. Sharon was asked recently what made him change his mind, and risk his own life and political career, to undertake a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza after so many years opposing such a move. His answer: There were things he could see "from here" that he couldn't see "from there."

There are many situations where I'd trust Prime Minister Sharon more than Thomas. This is not one of them. PM Sharon is not risking his life to withdraw from Gaza.

"Sharon has started to give up his popularity among his own constituency, because he realizes that the welfare of the Israeli people, as a whole, requires decisions that are unpopular but unavoidable," said the Israeli political theorist Yaron Ezrahi. But Sharon cannot stop just with Gaza. He's got a lot more popularity to give up with his old constituency if we're going to see a deal on the West Bank.

But we won't see a deal. Certainly no time soon. Part of the problem are people like Thomas who approve every demand of the "moderate" Palestinians. All of Judea and Samaria? Sure that's reasonable. Well, actually it isn't. As long as the Palestinians know that anything less than 100% of Judea and Samaria will be dismissed as "Bantustans" by Israel's critics, well they'll hold out for that and claim the moral high ground.

Finally, what about President Bush? When it comes to the Arab-Israel question, he's had a little bit of Arafat disease himself. He's given some of the best speeches of any president on the Arab-Israel issue and delivered the most pathetic diplomacy I have ever seen.

I remind him of what Aluf Benn has written (link no longer available):

The Bush administration, which appears indifferent, has been far more involved than any previous administrations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has courageously presented the two sides with practical objectives and demands, instead of making do with the statement that the U.S. cannot want a peace settlement more than the parties themselves - a statement that has justified past failures. Under Bush, Sharon has adopted a policy that is the reverse of what he believes in, and has accepted severe limitations on his own freedom of action. Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, who tried to lead the previous administration by the nose, has tried to continue his policy of lies with Bush and has been punished: He is under house arrest and is being blackballed diplomatically.

Instead of looking at things with any sort of in depth insight, Thomas looks at things superficially. A lack of progress is not necessarily the President's fault. The President can't make the Palestinians want peace more than he does. Until that changes pushing forward is a mistake; perhaps even a dangerous mistake.

This divide reflects the paralyzing split in his administration between those who understand that America will never win the war of ideas in the Middle East without working seriously on the most emotional issue in Arab political life - the Palestine question - and those, like the vice president and secretary of defense, who think the whole issue is overrated. The first group are right, the second are wrong. The president needs to choose.

Nope, the first group is wrong.
Here's Daniel Pipes in "Israel's Moment of Truth" from February 2000 - When Ehud Barak was Prime Minister:

Historically, Arab "rejectionism"--that is, the refusal to accept the permanent existence of a sovereign Jewish state in its historic homeland --has been based on one or another local variant (pan-Arab, pan-Syrian, Palestinian, or the like) of nationalism, a European import into the Middle East. It has suffered from two disabilities: limited reach and factionalism. But as, recent years, the rejection of Israel has taken on a less secular and more Islamic complexion, it has gained a deeper resonance among ordinary Arabs, with Israel's existence now cast as an affront to God's will, and has also benefited operationally from a somewhat greater degree of unity (Islamists are surprisingly good at working together). The net effect has been not to moderate but, on the contrary, to solidify and to sharpen Arab antagonism to Israel--vocal rejectionist elements now include pious Muslims and Islamists, Arab nationalists, despots, and intellectuals--and to give fresh impetus to the age-old dream of destroying it.

The point cannot be made often or strongly enough that, in their great majority, Arabic speakers do continue to repudiate the idea of peace with Israel. Despite having lost six rounds of war, they seem nothing loath to try again. In one of the most recent in-depth surveys of Arab opinion, conducted by the political scientist Hilal Khashan of the American University of Beirut, sixteen hundred respondents, divided equally among Jordanians, Lebanese, Palestinians, and Syrians, stated by a ratio of 69 to 28 percent that they personally did not want peace with Israel. By 79 to 18 percent, they rejected the idea of doing business with Israelis even after a total peace. By 80 to 19 percent, they rejected learning about Israel. By 87 to 13 percent, they supported attacks by Islamic groups against Israel.

This is the view of Israel that dominates political debate in the Arab world and that is conveyed to the public in every arena from scholarly discourse to the popular media to nursery-school jingles. True, some Arabs think otherwise. The late King Hussein of Jordan spoke eloquently of the need to put aside the conflict with Israel and to get on with things; his son and successor appears to be of like mind. Some Arab army officers would undoubtedly prefer not to confront Israel's military forces any time soon. Kuwaitis and Lebanese Christians, sobered by occupation, now mostly wish to leave Israel alone. And there are business leaders who believe, as one Arab banker succinctly put it, that "the whole purpose of peace is business." But these elements, overall, represent but a minority of the Arab population, and have not shifted the underlying hostility.

If Thomas were right, Arab opinion should have been more accepting of Israel in 2000.

Yasir Arafat preferred to die, beloved by all his people, in a Paris military hospital - rather than sacrifice his popularity and maybe his life so that the majority of his people could live and die at home. Will Ariel Sharon, George Bush and the Arab and Palestinian leaders now follow his model and play to the crowds, or play to history?

Yasser died in Paris not because he preferred anything. Until the end of his life he never had to pay a price for his irredentism. He could take the maximum position and not worry that he'd be marginalized. Too many for too long exonerated him because of his cause.
Crossposted on Israpundit and Soccer Dad.

Yasser Arafat is Bad

It took him awhile, but Thomas Friedman in "Footprints in the Sand" acknowledges:

He was a bad man

.
Let's delve a little deeper; here's the whole paragraph:

In the early 1990's, I sided with those Israelis who, though no fans of Arafat, were ready to deal with him at Oslo in the name of normalcy for both Israelis and Palestinians. But once it became clear, after the collapse of the Camp David talks, that no deal was possible with Arafat, I wished for his speedy disappearance. He was a bad man, not simply for the way he introduced a whole new level of terrorism to world politics, but because of the crimes he committed against his own people. There, history will judge him very harshly.

Thomas doesn't give himself nearly enough credit here. Not only did he side with those Israelis who were "no fans of Arafat" (please, many of them were!) he regularly heaped scorn upon those of us who pointed out that Arafat had never changed.
Here is an excerpt from an article in 1998, ("Netanyahu Hides Behind Virtual Peace Process", reprinted in the San Francisco Chronicle May 20, 1998 ):

Bibi is behaving as if he has three options: 1) No deal with the Palestinians. 2) A deal based on a magic formula that will satisfy the Palestinians and every extremist in his coalition. 3) A deal with the Palestinians, but one that will require him to actually lead. Options one and two are illusions. That leaves only option three: Bibi leading. But because he is so much better at spinning than deciding, his first instinct is always to spin. It's time for the United States to stop this charade and find out just who Bibi is. The United States has put a fair compromise on the table. Bibi has deliberately kept the Israeli public in the dark about it, always emphasizing only the costs and never, ever, the benefits.

At this time Netanyahu was insisting that the Palestinians abide by the terms they signed previously and were codified in the "Note for the Record" attached to the Hebron Accord.

Palestinian Responsibilities

The Palestinian side reaffirms its commitments to the following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement:

Complete the process of revising the Palestinian National Charter

Fighting terror and preventing violence

Strengthening security cooperation
Preventing incitement and hostile propaganda, as specified in Article XXII of the Interim Agreement
Combat systematically and effectively terrorist organizations and infrastructure
Apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists
Requests for transfer of suspects and defendants will be acted upon in accordance with Article II(7)(f) of Annex IV to the Interim Agreement
Confiscation of illegal firearms

Size of Palestinian Police will be pursuant to the Interim Agreement.

Exercise of Palestinian governmental activity, and location of Palestinian governmental offices, will be as specified in the Interim Agreement.
The aforementioned commitments will be dealt with immediately and in parallel.

None of these items are outrageous, but they were all consistently violated by the PA from the time of signing of the Oslo Accords. And it's hard to see how any sort of peace was possible as long as these were being violated. But Friedman ignored the bad faith of the Palestinians and Arafat and put the onus on Netanyahu. (The other outstanding issue at this time was the size of the further Israeli redeployment. Despite an assurance from the Clinton administration that Israel could determine the size of this withdrawal unilaterally, the administration sided with Arafat that the planned Israeli redeployment was too small.)
This is all the more outrageous as Friedman had previously written in "Netanyahu Encounters the King" (reprinted in the SF Chronicle, October 13, 1996):

There were two views of Netanyahu in the Arab world after his election: a Syrian-led view that he was a menace to peace (just like the Syrians!), and a Jordanian-Egyptian view that he was a tough pragmatist who would continue Oslo in his own way. That Jordanian-Egyptian view is crumbling, and that is a real strategic loss for Israel. Only a Hebron deal could force the Arabs to give Netanyahu a second look.

By hanging tough in Washington, Netanyahu built up chips at home. But does he have a strategy, and a will, to use those chips to strike a Hebron deal while not under pressure? Will he ever use his rhetorical skills not just to explain away his mistakes but to build a real consensus among Israelis for moving forward?

IOW, previously Friedman had used a deal on Hebron to give Netanyahu some credibility with "moderate" Arab rulers. Once Netanyahu agreed to cede most of Hebron to the PA and followed through, Friedman once again was demanding more of him and nothing of Arafat.
After the Camp David summit failed in July 2000, and the PA orchestrated a new war against Israel, Friedman wrote in "Arafat's War" (NY Times, October 13, 2000):

Here's why: The roots of this latest violent outburst can be traced directly back to President Clinton's press conference after the breakdown of the Camp David summit. At that time, Mr. Clinton pointedly, deliberately -- and rightly -- stated that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak had offered unprecedented compromises at the summit -- more than 90 percent of the West Bank for a Palestinian state, a partial resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem and Palestinian sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City of Jerusalem -- and that Yasir Arafat had not responded in kind, or at all.

Palestinians were shocked by Mr. Clinton's assessment. For the first time in a long time, Mr. Arafat no longer had the moral high ground. He, and the Arab leaders, had grown so comfortable with Bibi Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel -- a man the world always blamed for any peace breakdown -- that they were stunned and unprepared for the seriousness of Mr. Barak's offer and the bluntness of Mr. Clinton's assessment. Other world leaders told Mr. Arafat the same thing: Barak deserves a serious counteroffer.

Again he fails to take enough credit. Friedman was among those who consistently demonized Netanyahu no matter how much Netanyahu advanced the peace process, absent any parallel progress from Arafat and the PA.
(Back to the present.)

Google is a wonderful tool. I spent time the other day Googling every variation I could of the words: "Yasir Arafat and Palestine and education." I couldn't come up with a single speech, or even full paragraph, in which Arafat laid out his vision for how Palestinians would educate their youth and nurture their talents. Maybe all his speeches on that subject were never translated from Arabic. Or maybe they just don't exist - because this was never his priority. His obsession was with Palestinian "land," not Palestinian "life." Google the words "Yasir Arafat and martyrdom and jihad," and the matches go on for pages.

Now he tells us? If he'd Googled or Yahoo!ed in 1994, 1997 or 2000 he would have seen the same thing. He didn't want to. (Or he did and suppressed his discovery.) Against all available evidence he put the onus for the failing peace process on Israel and usually ignored - with rare exceptions - the blatant disregard of Arafat and his government of that process.
Friedman, like many others in political, diplomatic and journalistic circles, was one of Arafat's enablers. He's been someone who has placed hope over evidence that Arafat was a "partner for peace." Unlike a more serious observer, like the late Michael Kelly who wrote:

I heard a good one the other day. It was from someone I am permitted to call a Close Observer of the Bush Administration's Foreign Policy, and it was on the afternoon that President Bush told Ariel Sharon to let Yasser Arafat out of his room, and told Arafat to settle down and be a partner for peace after all. On this latter point, I expressed doubt. "Well," said Close Observer, "there is always a possibility the dog will sing."

Friedman kept on insisting that he heard the dog singing.
I hope to write sometime that Arafat's legacy is less about what he did or didn't do to make peace than in what others saw in him or pretended to see in him. Thomas Friedman is merely Exhibit A in that dreary Hall of Shame.